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Recent Decisions
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION - ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS - NORTH CAROLINA AND OHIO STATUTES COMPARED
A building contract provided that any future controversy there-
under was to be submitted to arbitration, stating that "the decision of
the arbitrators shall be a condition precedent to any right of legal
action that either party may have against the other." A suit by the
contractor was brought for alleged balance due on the contract; the
defendant demurred on the ground that under the contract the plain-
tiff must first resort to arbitration before he might maintain this action.
The Superior Court overruled the defendant's demurrer and the de-
fendant appealed. Held, affirmed. The demurrer was rightly over-
ruled since the arbitration clause concerning future controversies did
not present a bar to action for breach of contract. Skinner v. Gaither
Corp. 67 S. E. 2d 267 (North Carolina 1951).
The decision is consistent with the North Carolina Uniform Arbi-
tration Act which limits agreements to arbitrate to "any controversy
existing between the parties at the time of the agreement to submit."
I N. C. Gen. Stat. § 1-544 (1927). The statute, a verbatim passage of
of the act as adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, might be termed a middle ground between the
common law remedy of arbitration and statutes of North Carolina's
commercially-minded sister states, including Ohio and New York.
See HANDBOOK ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMnIxISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws and the Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting
of 1925, 63-81. While the act has liberalized the common law rule by
denying the right to rescind the contract to submit the existing con-
troversy to arbitration once it is made [for prior law see Long v.
Cormer, 181 N. C. 354, 107 S. E. 217 (1921); Williams v. Branning
Mfg. Co., 153 N. C. 7, 68 S. E. 217 (1910)], it does not embrace agree-
ments as to future disputes, nor does it expressly provide a procedure
by which to procure a decree of specific performance for direct en-
forcement of the agreement. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
AwARD 295 (1930); 8 Am. Jur. 856, 906; Comment. 6 N. C. L. REV.
363 (1928).
It is interesting to compare the North Carolina statute with the
Ohio Arbitration Statute, OHIO GEN. CODE §12148-1 et seq. That act,
adopted in 1931, followed the suggestion of the American Arbitration
Association by repealing the former arbitration statute (OHIO GEN.
CODE §12148). Under the present Ohio statute not only existing
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disputes but also future disputes may be the subject of arbitration,
Riley Stoker Corp. v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 28 Ohio L. Abs. 609 (1939);
note, 4 CIN. L. R.Ev. 64; also, direct enforcement by specific performance
of the arbitration agreement is provided for. OHIO GEN. CODE §12148-3;
See Utility Worker's Union of America v. Ohio Power Co., 36 Ohio
Op. 324, 77 N.E. 2d 631 (1947); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U. S. 109 (1923); 3 Am. Jur. 909. And, under OHIO GEN. CODE
§12148-2, the question in the principal case, supra, would have been
decided in favor of the defendant, since the Ohio act provides for
indirect enforcement, and breach of the agreement is a bar to an action
in a court of law. Columbus Fruit and Vegetable Coop. Ass'n. v. Reeb,
2 Ohio Op. 109 (1984); 3 0. Jur. §17 (1943 Cum. Supp. 445). Demur-
rer is not the proper method to invoke the arbitration clause, how-
ever. Section 12148-2 of the General Code provides that an application
for stay of proceedings must be used to invoke this indirect enforce-
ment. Columbus Fruit and Vegetable Coop. Ass'n. v. Reeb, supra. A
third method of enforcement under the Ohio act is provided by
collateral enforcement. OHio GEN. CODE §12148-4 gives the court juris-
diction to appoint arbitrators empowered to proceed with the arbitra-
tion. See American Laundry Mchy. Co. v. Prosperity Co., 27 Ohio Op.
393 (1944).
From this necessarily limited comparison of the two statutes, it
may be seen that Ohio, unlike North Carolina, has hurdled the com-
mon-law barriers against commercial arbitration, i.e., limitation to
existing disputes, and insufficient enforcement of the agreements. It
is interesting to note that among the states embracing the statutes as
adopted by Ohio are the commercial states: New York, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, California, Pennsylvania and Michigan. What has been
the driving force compelling these states to adopt such radical legisla-
tion upheaving the common law roots? Obviously, dissatisfaction with
the delay, expense and technicalities of the courts, and the inability of
inexpert juries to understand specialized cases, all play a part. See
Comment, 19 MICH. ST. BAR J. 626 (1940). The success of arbitration
statutes in other states, however, has been the affirmative argument for
passage in Ohio. Now that the archaic provisions are removed from
the law, an increasing number of agreements to arbitrate are being in-
corporated not only in general contracts, but also in by-laws or articles
of membership of trade associations and chambers of commerce. See
KELLOR, AzEmCAN ARBrrRATON Ch. XVI (1948). Where such agree-
ments are sustained by a statute making them irrevocable and
specifically enforceable, their use not only insures arbitration in lieu
of litigation, but also, in many cases, tends to prevent even arbitrations.
Victor F. Greenslade.
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CONFLICT OF LAWs - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT - ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN DEATH STATUTES
Administrator brought a wrongful death action in a Wisconsin
court against the individual defendant and an insurance company.
Decedent and both defendants were residents of Wisconsin, but, since
the defendant had been fatally injured in an automobile accident in
Illinois, the administrator based his claim upon the Illinois wrongful
death statute. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the Wisconsin wrongful death statute, creating a right of action
for wrongful death "provided that such action shall be brought for a
death caused in this state" was declaratory of a local policy against
entertaining actions based upon the death statutes of sister states.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. Hughes, Adm. v. Fetter, et al.,
257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W. 2d 452 (1950). On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Held, reversed. The local policy of Wisconsin is in
contravention of and must give way to the unifying policy of the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. Hughes,
Adm. v. Fetter, et al., 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
In the principal case the Court reaffirmed the rule that Article IV,
§1 of the United States Constitution does not require automatic sub-
ordination of local policy to foreign law in all cases. Pink v. A.A.A.
Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941); Alaska Packers Ass'n. v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). However,
there are at least two kinds of actions in which the full faith and credit
clause, despite the existence of a contrary local policy, has been regular-
ly employed to require forum recognition of rights arising under the
laws of sister states. These are (1) actions which involve forum recogni-
tion of the constitutions or by-laws of fraternal benefit associations or
the pertinent statutes of the states in which these associations are organ-
ized, Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925);
Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), and
(2) actions brought against non-resident stockholders to enforce the
assessment statutes of the state of incorporation. Converse v. Hamilton,
224 U.S. 243 (1912); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). Both
situations rest upon the superior consideration accorded the law of the
state of incorporation because of the relationship voluntarily entered
by the members of either type of association. See, e.g., Order of Com-
mercial Travelers v. Wolfe, supra at 605, and Broderick v. Rosner,
supra at 643 for discussions of this rationale.
Application of Art. IV, §1 to workmen's compensation statutes,
first viewed as requiring strict observance by the forum state of the
statute of the state of employment, Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), has been all but eliminated by subsequent
decisions permitting the forum to enforce its own statute when it has
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a significant governmental interest in the affair. Alaska Packers Ass'n.
v. Industrial Accident Commission, supra; Pacific Employers Insur-
ance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
Compulsory application of foreign law is also required by Art. IV, §1
in actions based on contracts completed in sister states, where the
forum's only connection with the transaction is that the action was
brought in its courts. John Hancock Insurance Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936). For a similar result, based on the due process and con-
tracts clauses, see Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
The principal case falls in none of these categories. Justice
Frankfurter in his dissent emphasized that Illinois had no interest in
the matter which could justify forcing Wisconsin to forego its policy
and enforce the law of Illinois. However, the decision is in line with
the general rule of conflicts that the law of the state where the fatal
injury occurs governs this type of action. This rule is mechanically ap-
plied where no exclusionary policy of the forum is in issue. BEALE,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1305 and cases cited.
No Wisconsin policy against enforcement of wrongful death
statutes in general was involved in the instant case since the Wisconsin
statute itself provided for the enforcement of the action where the
cause of death occurred in that state. Wis. Stat., §331.03 (1949). The
Wisconsin policy was formulated either to prevent burdening its courts
or to retaliate for the Illinois act which also prevents the enforcement
of the wrongful death statutes of other states in the Illinois courts.
Smith-Hurd's Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 70, M1, 2 (1936). Neither reason seems
substantial in comparison to the greater interest in unrestricted en-
forcement in state courts of rights validly arising under the public acts
of sister states.
Although the principal case contains some limiting language,
the Supreme Court recently refused to hold valid a distinction drawn
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in a
case arising under the Illinois wrongful death act, supra, which also
embodies an exclusionary policy. First National Bank of Chicago v.
United Air Lines, 190 F. 2d 493 (1951). In that case the court dis-
tinguished the instant decision on the ground that the Wisconsin
policy, which precluded the enforcement of the wrongful death statutes
of sister states under any circumstances, might have resulted in a
denial of any remedy to the plaintiff when the defendant could be
serviced only in Wisconsin, while the Illinois statute did not present
the same danger since enforcement of the foreign statute in the Illinois
courts is permitted when the defendant cannot be serviced in the state
in which the plaintiff's right of action arose. Upon review, however,
the Supreme Court held the principal case controlling, First National
Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 72 Sup. Ct. 421 (1952), a result
which indicates continued employment of the full faith and credit
1952]
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clause to invalidate state exclusionary rules based on insubstantial
local policy whether or not relief is available elsewhere.
Anthony R. De Santo.
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINED
DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION
Petitioner was convicted in a District Court of Nebraska of man-
slaughter. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the conviction
over the objection that the admission of petitioner's confession violated
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Petitioner,
a 38 year old Mexican farm hand who could neither speak nor write
English, claimed that confessions of homocide made to Texas authori-
ties after he had been in illegal custody for 25 days and while without
the advice of counsel and prior to his arraignment, were involuntary
and obtained in violation of the requirements of due process. Held,
conviction affirmed. Nebraska, in admitting the confessions, neither
violated federal requirements of due process nor standards of decency
and justice. Due process requires only that the confession be voluntary.
Gallegos v. State of Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
State courts almost uniformly have admitted any confession that
is deemed to be voluntary and trustworthy, regardless of the method
used to obtain it. People v. Viti, 408 Ill. 206, 96 N.E. 2d 541 (1951);
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 367 Pa. 135, 79 A. 2d 193 (1951); See 3
Wigmore, Evidence §822 (3rd ed. 1940); 94 A.L.R. 1036 (1934). That
the confession was obtained during a period of illegal detention in
violation of an arraignment statute has not in itself required exclusion
of the confession as evidence, although it may be considered in de-
termining if the confession was involuntary. State v. Pierce, 4 N.J. 252,
72 A. 2d 249 (1950).
Prior to 1943 the Supreme Court of the United States used the
same test in reviewing federal criminal cases. Wilson v. United States,
162 U.S. 613 (1896); Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924). In 1943,
however, the Court added to the voluntary-trustworthy test the stipula-
tion that the confession, even though voluntary, would be excluded if
it had been obtained during a period of detention illegal because of a
failure to arraign the accused before a committing magistrate. Like
most state arraignment statutes, Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires an arresting officer to take the arrested
person before the nearest committing officer without unnecessary delay.
Thus, if federal officers violate this rule, any confession obtained dur-
ing the period of illegal detention will not be admitted as evidence in
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court. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v.
United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). Since the reason for this new doc-
trine is to abolish unlawful detention, a confession to one crime, made
while the accused was in lawful custody concerning another crime, is
admissible even though the accused had not been arraigned on the
crime to which he confessed. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S.
36 (1951).
The Court stated in the McNabb case, supra, that the illegal de-
tention rule was merely a rule of evidence which it had the right to
require in the federal court system but which it could not impose
upon the states. Prior to the McNabb case, supra, in reviewing cases
from state courts, the Court had used the voluntary-trustworthy test.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S.
530 (1940). In several cases following the McNabb case, supra, how-
ever, the Court came very close to stating that illegal detention in
violation of arraignment statutes was in itself so "inherently coercive"
that it was a deprivation of due process. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) ; Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948). The states were beginning to feel the effect of the
McNabb rule. In the Ashcraft case, supra, the Court disregarded the
voluntary-trustworthy test and relied heavily on the fact that the con-
fession had been obtained while the accused was held incommunicado
during a 36 hour delay in arraignment. Mr. Justice Jackson declared in
his dissent that the Court had forgotten the voluntary-trustworthy test
and was punishing police practices. Apparently the Supreme Court
was beginning to demand the same civilized standards of state police
that it demanded of federal police. In his concurring opinion in the
Malinski case, supra, Mr. Justice Frankfurter not only condemned
delay in arraignment for the purpose of obtaining a confession, but
intimated that in itself it might be a deprivation of due process. In the
Haley, case, supra, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court said,
"The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the police from using the
private, secret custody of either man or child as a device for wringing
confessions from them." In the following year the Supreme Court
reversed three more cases where the arraignment had been delayed for
the purpose of obtaining a confession, even though the Court felt the
confessions were trustworthy. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South Carolina,
338 U.S. 68 (1949). In a dissent to two of these three companion cases,
338 U.S. 52, 62 (1949), Mr. Justice Jackson raised the query that "Each
of these murders was unwitnessed, and the only positive knowledge on
which a solution could be based was possessed by the killer .... The
seriousness of the Court's judgment is that no one suggests that any
course held promise of solution of these murders other than to take the
suspect into custody for questioning. The alternative was to close the
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books on the crime and forget it, with the suspect at large. This is a
grave choice for a society in which two thirds of the murders are
closed out as insoluable .... Is it a necessary price to pay for the
fairness which we know as 'due process of law'?"
In spite of Mr. Justice Jackson's cogent dissent, it appeared that
the Supreme Court was ready to demand obeyance to the various state
arraignment statutes as a requirement of due process, although the
Court had been influenced in each of the cases by other factors, e.g.,
the age of the petitioner, Haley v. Ohio, supra.
These strong Supreme Court opinions condemning the use of
confessions obtained during illegal detention made it seem likely that
many state courts would themselves require observance of their ar-
raignment statutes. Only a few states, however, have even acknowledged
the persuasiveness of the McNabb doctrine. e.g. State v. Kotthoff, 67
Idaho 319, 177 P. 2d 474 (1947); Commonwealth v. Mayhew, 297 Ky.
172, 178 S.W. 2d 928 (1944). The majority flatly refuse to follow it on
the grounds that if a confession is trustworthy it would be an injustice
to society to deny its use in evidence against a criminal solely because
of the manner in which it was obtained. People v. Brocamp, 307 111.
448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923); Owens v. State, 133 Miss. 753, 98 So. 233
(1923). This refusal to follow the McNabb rule is inconsistent with the
reasoning these same states use in excluding evidence obtained by an
illegal search or seizure-evidence which is much more reliable and
trustworthy than an illegally obtained confession. People v. Lazenby,
403 Ill. 95, 85 N.E. 2d 660 (1949); Winston v. State, 209 Miss. 799, 48
So. 2d 513 (1951). If a person cannot pose as the accused's attorney in
order to get an admissible confession, even though that confession
would likely be trustworthy, it is inconsistent to allow him to obtain
one by violation of a statute. Yet at least one state even permits this
inconsistency. People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 227, 27 N.W. 539 (1886).
Again, many states, though refusing to follow the McNabb rule itself,
follow a theory of public policy similar to that behind the McNabb
rule when they refuse to convict a person who has been the victim
of police entrapment. People v. Lee, 9 Cal. App. 2d 99, 48 P. 2d 1003
(1935) ; State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056, 33 S.W. 2d 923 (1931) ; see 22
C.J.S., Criminal Law sec. 45.
People familiar with the third degree practice maintain that the
only effective way to eliminate it is by a requirement that the arrested
person be immediately arraigned before a magistrate. 3 Wigmore,
Evidence §851 (3rd ed. 1940); Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforce-
ment, National Committee on Law Observance and Enforcement
(1931). Once before a magistrate, the accused is told of his rights; he
may secure counsel and obtain the assistance of his friends. These
rights he can not exercise while he is being held incommunicado by
the police. To remove the inducement to resort to such illegal practices
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as the third degree, the courts should deny the use of any fruits these
practices may produce.
Before the instant case, many people hoped and felt the day was
near when the Supreme Court would eliminate illegal detention and
its offspring, the third degree, by making immediate arraignment a
requirement of due process. In the instant case, however, the Court has
apparently abandoned its crusade to compel observance of arraign-
ment statutes by state officials. The Court disregarded such cases as
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra, and Haley v. Ohio, supra, where stress
had been laid upon violation of arraignment statutes and third degree
methods of police as being violations of due process. Perhaps the in-
stant case is distinguishable upon the ground that the petitioner's con-
fession came early in the 25 day period of illegal detention. At any
rate, it is hoped that the Court's step backward is only temporary, and
some day soon it will declare secret, illegal detention of an accused for
the purpose of obtaining a confession to be a violation of due process
in itself.
Duane L. Isham.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW - MUNICIPAL POWER TO
DEFINE CRIMES
The defendant was convicted of violating Section 943-2 of the
General Ordinances of the City of Dayton, Ohio, which defined
criminal assault and battery in the exact terms of Ohio General Code
Section 12423, but which provided a greater maximum penalty than
the statute. The maximum penalty provided by the ordinance was
$1,000 or one year imprisonment or both, while the maximum penalty
under the statute was only $200 or six months imprisonment or both.
The defendant contended that a municipality has no power to define
assault and battery as a crime. On appeal, held, affirmed. A munici-
pality has constitutional authority to adopt and enforce a penal
ordinance defining assault and battery. City of Dayton v. Miller, 154
Ohio St. 500, 96 N.E. 2d 780 (1951).
Until 1912 all municipal police power in Ohio was derived by
delegation from the General Assembly. Under this system, although
the General Assembly did not delegate the power to define and punish
felonies, they did delegate the power to define and punish certain
misdemeanors. Assault and battery was not among them. City of
Wellsville v. O'Connor, 14 Ohio Cir. Dec. 689 (1902).
In 1912 the people of Ohio substantially modified the pattern of
complete legislative supremacy by approving the Home Rule Amend-
ment to the Constitution. This amendment directly grants the cities
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and villages authority "to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in con-
flict with general laws." Ohio Const. Art. XVIII, §3. By this grant the
municipalities and the state exercise the police power concurrently in
prohibiting and punishing criminal acts. Greenberg v. City of Cleve-
land, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N. E. 829 (1918). The courts have consistent-
ly held that assault and battery ordinances are within the scope of the
municipal police power. Kearney v. Cincinnati, 29 Ohio Dec. N.P. 594
(1919); In Re Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E. 2d 388 (1949);
Matthews v. Russell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E. 2d 696 (1949).
Since a municipality's power to define a crime and provide
punitive sanctions is no longer in question, the issue has become one
of limitation. May a municipality define a major crime such as arson,
robbery or larceny, and provide penalties greater than one year
imprisonment?
The ordinance in the principal case illustrates the extent of
municipal police regulation to date. This is the first criminal assault
and battery ordinance to be held valid by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The opinion expresses no limit to the type of crime that a municipality
may define. The penalty imposed by the ordinance is severe. It not
only exceeds the penalty in the Ohio Statute by a wide margin, but if
the imprisonment provided was for one more day, it would be the
equivalent of a felony under federal statutes. 18 U.S.C. §1 (1948).
Limitation on municipal police power is provided in the Home
Rule Amendment, which requires that an ordinance must not conflict
with the general laws of the state. As this has been interpreted, conflict
arises only when particular conduct of citizens is both authorized by
a statute and prohibited by an ordinance, or vice versa. Village of
Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923). The applica-
tion of this rule creates difficulties, but it is certain there could be no
conflict, in this sense, if a municipality would adopt in an ordinance
the exact language of a statute defining a major crime. The ordinance
and the statute would then be prohibiting the same conduct.
The non-conflict clause does not limit the municipal power to
provide punitive sanctions, since a penalty does not alter the rule
of conduct required by the statute. Though the ordinance might im-
pose a greater penalty than the statute, the same conduct would still
be prohibited. Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844
(1929); Leipsic v. Folk, 38 Ohio App. 117, 176 N.E. 95 (1931); In re
Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E. 2d 388 (1949) ; Matthews v. Rus-
sell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E. 2d 696 (1949).
The General Assembly cannot use the non-conflict clause to limit
expressly the municipal power to define crimes and provide punish-
ment. No conflict with a statute expressly limiting the punishment an
ordinance may impose is created by the adoption of a penal ordinance
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exceeding that limit, since the statute does not prescribe a general
rule of conduct to be followed by citizens, but merely regulates munici-
pal legislative action. Youngstown v. Evans, supra; Matthews v. Russell,
supra. A statute that limits the type of crime of a municipality may
define would be ineffective for the same reason.
The only constitutional limitation on the severity of punishment
is that forbidding the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."
Ohio Const. Art. I §9. No matter how severe, the amount of fine or
length of sentence imposed does not constitute "cruel and unusual
punishments." Holt v. State, 107 Ohio St. 307, 314, 140 N.E. 349 (1923);
In Re Calhoun, supra.
Since there is no effective express limitation in the Constitution
and the General Assembly cannot provide a limitation, what, if any-
thing, will restrain the municipalities from defining major crimes?
The fundamental rule that the sovereign alone can create a
crime is no longer a restraint on Ohio municipalities. This restraint
was removed by the sovereign, the people of Ohio, when the power to
define crimes was constitutionally delegated to the municipalities. The
issue now is, did the sovereign intend to delegate to municipalities the
power to create major crimes?
The sovereign's intent is not dear, but a strong historical argu-
ment can be made that the power to define major crimes was not in-
tended to be delegated. The basis of the argument is the fact that this
power has never been delegated to cities anywhere else in the United
States. If the delegation of such an extraordinary power had been
intended, presumably there would have been a sharp conflict of opinion
among the Constitutional Convention delegates, followed by long
debates. The Constitutional Convention Debates of 1912 contain no
such discussion.
Since no local government has attempted to define a major crime,
the courts have not been required to rule on the extent of the sub-
stantive home rule power. The only judicial expression is a syllabus
which states that the power to define a felony is lodged in the General
Assembly exclusively. State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885
(1922); approved in, State v. Steele, 121 Ohio St. 332, 168 N.E. 847
(1929). This syllabus does not solve the problem since the principle of
law here being considered was neither in issue nor discussed in the
majority opinion of either case. There is no assurance the Supreme
Court would rule the same way if that question were in issue.
The sweeping general language used in the Home Rule Amend-
ment leaves the police power of Ohio municipalities uncertain. A
literal interpretation would allow the municipalities to define major
crimes, but the history of the amendment suggests an implied limita-
tion. If a constitutional convention is voted in 1952, that body might
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find it advantageous to propose an amendment to resolve this un-
certainty rather than leave it for interpretation by the courts at a
later date.
Charles E. Shanklin.
SALES AND USE TAx - EX MPTIONS
The taxpayer was in the business of manufacturing and selling
concrete by the "transit mix" method. A mixer was mounted on a
motor truck chassis and the mixing or manufacture of the concrete
occurred during the time the mixer and its contents were being trans-
ported to the location where the concrete was to be delivered and
utilized. The concrete mixing apparatus and the motor truck chassis
were separate units and were separately purchased from different
sources.
The Tax Commissioner of the State of Ohio entered an order
levying an assessment of sales and use taxes on the truck chassis. The
order was affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals. On appeal, held,
affirmed. The truck chassis were not employed directly in the pro-
duction of tangible personal property for sale by manufacturing with-
in the meaning of the Sales and Use Tax Acts. W. E. Anderson & Sons
Co. v. Glander, Tax Comm'r., 154 Ohio St. 561, 97 N. E. 2d 29 (1951).
The Ohio General Code exempts from the sales and use taxes
items where ".. . the purpose of the consumer is... to use or consume
the thing transferred directly in the production of tangible personal
property for sale by manufacturing, processing,. " OHio GEN.
CODE §§5546-1, 5546-25.
Since the adoption of the Ohio Sales Tax law in 1934, Section
5546-1 has undergone several changes. A consideration of these changes
is helpful in ascertaining the legislative intent.
In its original form the statute, OHIo GEN. CODE §5546-1, read:
"'Retail sale' and 'Sale at retail' include all sales excepting those in
which the purpose of the consumer is. .. to use or consume the thing
transferred in manufacturing, retailing, processing, or refining or in
the rendition of a public utility service." 115 Ohio Laws, pt. 2, 306
(1934). The statute was later amended to add the word "mining"
after the word "refining". 116 Ohio Laws 242 (1935). The pertinent
part of the statute was then changed to its present form of: ". . . to
use or consume the thing transferred directly in the production of
tangible personal property for sale by manufacturing ... processing,
... mining, ...." 116 Ohio Laws, pt. 2, 70 (1935). There have been
several other amendments to this section but they are not relevant to
this discussion.
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From the history of such statutory changes, it appears that the
exception was first intended to cover certain industries. These in-
dustry-wide exceptions were finally restricted to include the sales and
use of only those items of tangible personal property, in an industry,
used or consumed directly in producing tangible personal property for
sale. Fyr-Fyter Co. v. Glander, Tax Comm'r., 150 Ohio St. 118, 80 N.E.
2d 776 (1948).
A fundamental objective of the Ohio Sales Tax Act is to prevent
a pyramiding of taxes. The tax, therefore, is levied wherever possible
on the sale to the ultimate consumer. Under the original act practically
anything purchased by a manufacturer was exempt. This was following
the above stated policy to the utmost since any cost to the manufacturer
is ultimately passed on to the final consumer. A conflict arose between
this objective of no double taxation and that always present objective
of raising revenue. As a result the present form of the statute was
adopted so as to bring these objectives into balance. See 11 OHIo ST.
L. J. 143 (1950).
Recently there have been many cases interpreting this statute.
The courts have said that for the purchase of an item to be excepted
from taxation under this section the item must be indispensable to,
and directly connected with, the actual manufacture or processing of
the particular article to be sold. Jackson Iron 8c Steel Co. v. Glander,
Tax Comm'r., 154 Ohio St. 369, 96 N.E. 2d 21 (1950).
In the field of transportation equipment, the means of transporta-
tion is exempt from the sales or use tax only when the transportation
is a part of the processing. The court in Tri-State Asphalt Corp. v.
Glander, Tax Comm'r., 152 Ohio St. 497, 90 N.E. 2d 366 (1950) held
that boom and bucket cranes that had the sole use of conveying in-
gredients to the place of processing were not within the exception to
the tax. In Dye Coal Co. v. Evatt, Tax Comm'r., 144 Ohio St. 233, 58
N.E. 2d 653 (1944), the court held that the purchase of trucks for use
in conveying coal from the pits to a tipple where such coal was cleaned
and graded for shipment was exempt from taxation for the reason
that such was a part of mining. The holding in Crowell-Collier Pub.
Co. v. Glander, Tax Comm'r., 155 Ohio St. 511, 99 N.E. 2d 649
(1951), was that a line conveyer used to convey bundles of magazines
from the mailing room to railroad cars and trucks was not exempt
from the sales tax because "the production is completed when the
conveyer picks them up."
The principal case follows this narrow interpretation of the word
"directly" and tends to extend this interpretation by permitting
an exception of only that part of the item that is directly used in
production.
William H. Schneider.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - THIRD P.ARTY LuILrrY
The defendant, who owned and personally operated one of the
trucks in his trucking business, invited the plaintiff to sell vegetable
produce from the open tail-gate of the truck. The defendant employed
truckers and had elected to be bound as an employer under the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act. The plaintiff and his employer were
also under the Act. Injured by the personal negligence of the de-
fendant in operating his truck, the plaintiff brought a common law
action for damages, contending that Section 29 of the Illinois Work-
men's Compensation Act, which limits an injured employee to com-
pensation when injured by a negligent third party also "bound by
this Act," was applicable only to third party employees and not third
party employers directly causing the injury. The lower court dismissed
the suit on the basis of the Illinois Act. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides compensation
as the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff. Petrazelli v. Propper,
409 Ill. 365, 99 N.E. 2d 140 (1951).
Under Section 29 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act,
where the employer, his injured employee, and the negligent third
party are all "bound by this Act", the common law right of action of
the employee is "abolished." In these circumstances, the employee is
given compensation and his cause of action is transferred to his em-
ployer, who may sue the third party to recover damages not exceeding
the aggregate amount of compensation payable to the injured employee
under the Act. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 48 §29 (1947). Prior to the instant
case, two types of cases involving third party liability under Section
29 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act had arisen; actions
against a third party employee, Thorton v. Herman, 380 Ill. 341, 43
N.E. 2d 934 (1942), and actions against a third party employer under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, Stevens v. Illinois Central R.R.,
306 I1. 370, 137 N.E. 2d 859 (1923). In both types of action the in-
jury had been caused by a third party employee rather than a third
party employer. Thus, although the Court in both situations limited
the injured employee to his remedy of compensation and stated that
"bound by this act" as used in Section 29 included third party em-
ployers as well as third party employees, there was some doubt
whether, in reality, the Act did not provide a personal defense to
third party employees transferable to third party employers only in
suits based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. The instant case,
involving as it did a third party employer directly responsible for the
injury, settled that doubt. Third party employers are directly pro-
tected by Section 29 of the Act.
The rationale of these decisions has been that Section 29 should
be read in the context of the entire Workmen's Compensation Act,
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and interpreted in the light of the public policy behind the Act, that
accidents caused in industry are to be borne as a part of the cost of
production in that industry. Hays v. Illinois Terminal Transportation
Co., 363 Ill. 397, 2 N.E. 2d 309 (1936). A more detailed analysis of
the public policy behind Section 29 of the Illinois Act can be found in
DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WOaRKAN's COMPENSATION 611-616 (1936)
where it is stated, "Suits against third parties have been less advan-
tageous to the injured employee than collection of compensation.
This is due to slow payment if judgment is received, lump sum
payment, and high cost of litigation imposed on the employee, all of
which the Workmen's Compensation Act intended to cure." In other
words, Section 29 by forcing the employee to resort to the Act ex-
clusively, in the majority of cases should leave him in a better position.
Another explanation of Section 29 may be found in WRIGHT, SUBRO-
GATION UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AaTs 1 (1948) which states
that a major purpose of subrogation provisions such as Section 29 is
to grant a method of relief to innocent employers, and at the same
time to prevent exorbitant claims against third parties who have ac-
cepted the Act and are sharing in its burdens. While the rationale of
the Illinois Court and the analysis of both Dodd and Wright are
correct in theory, the desired results are not always achieved in
practice. The injured party's employer often contests awards resulting
in delay of the receipt of compensation by the employee. In turn,
this delay often prevents compensation from being fixed and de-
termined until the Statute of Limitations has run, barring recovery
by the employer against the negligent third party. See 7 Cm. L. REv.
569 (1939-40). The Illinois Court in recognition of this problem has
stated, ".... we feel bound to hold that the right of the employer to
sue is not a new cause of action created by Section 29, but is the
employees right of action taken from him and transferred to the
employer. We recognize this construction will in many cases defeat
recovery from the third party under Section 29, for it seems quite
clear that the employer is in no position to commence suit to en-
force his right of action until the damage he has sustained have been
fixed and determined." Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Chicago R.R., 307 Ill.
322, 188 N.E. 658 (1923).
Other states, recognizing that all inclusive subrogation provisions
do not solve every problem, have used such provisions only where the
third party is a fellow employee, or at least working on the same
project. Caira v. Caira, 296 Mass. 448, 6 N.E. 2d 431 (1937); WRIGHT,
SUBROGATION UNDER WORYMEN'S COMPENSATION AcTs c. IV (1948).
Ohio's Workmen's Compensation Act contains no subrogation pro-
visions whatsoever. OHIO GEN. CODE §1465-37 et seq.
The instant case, the first under Section 29 of the Illinois Act in-
volving an injury directly caused by a third party employer, has
1952]
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clearly established that under the Act third party employers as well
as third party employees are directly covered. Although the result
reached is consistent with the public policy behind the Act, the ad-
ministration of Section 29 still leaves many problems to be solved.
Harold Talisman.
